Rudisill v. McDonough, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–888_________________JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENISR. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRSon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the federal circuit[April 16, 2024]Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of theCourt.Petitioner James Rudisill first enlisted in theUnited States Army in the year 2000. Over the next decade, hereenlisted twice, serving a total of eight years on active duty. Asa result of his first period of military service, Rudisill wasentitled to 36 months of educational benefits under the MontgomeryGI Bill, to be paid by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).Rudisill’s subsequent periods of service separately entitled him to36 months of educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Bothof Rudisill’s entitlements were subject to a 48-monthaggregate-benefits cap.Rudisill used 25 months and 14 days of hisMontgomery benefits to help fund his undergraduate degree. Then,after serving his third tour of duty, Rudisill sought to use hisPost-9/11 benefits to attend divinity school.The VA informed Rudisill that his Post-9/11benefits were limited to the duration of his unused Montgomerybenefits, pursuant to a provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38U.S. C. §3327(d)(2). In other words, according to the VA, byrequesting Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of hisMontgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months ofbenefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would otherwise beentitled.The question before us is whether Rudisill canaccess his Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without being subject to§3327(d)(2)’s durational limit. We hold that he can. Because hesimply seeks to use one of his two separate entitlements,§3327(d)(2) does not apply.IA“The United States has a proud history ofoffering educational assistance to millions of veterans, asdemonstrated by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.”Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, §5002(3),122Stat. 2358, 38 U.S.C. §3301 etseq. GIbills honor the sacrifices of those who have served in themilitary, and as such, “ha[ve] a positive effect on recruitment forthe Armed Forces.” Ibid. These education benefits have alsohelped to “reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjustingto civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United Stateseconomy.” Ibid.In the more than 75 years since Congress passedthe first GI Bill in response to World War II, it has enactedadditional GI bills, most of which share two relevant features.First, an individual with the requisite period of military servicebecomes “entitled to” educational benefits, typically in the formof a stipend or tuition payments, which the VA is then required toprovide once the veteran enrolls in an eligible education program.Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 58Stat. 288, 289; see also,e.g., Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66Stat.664–666; Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80Stat. 13,15. Second, with one brief exception,[1] GI bills from the Korean War onward have providededucation benefits to fully qualified servicemembers for a fixedduration: 36 months of benefits per GI bill, up to a total of 48months of benefits for those servicemembers who become eligible foreducational benefits under multiple GI bills. See 66Stat. 665;82Stat. 1331; 90Stat. 2396.[2]This case relates to the overlap between tworecent GI bills. The first is the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984,38 U.S.C. §3001 etseq. The Montgomery GIBill provides “[b]asic educational assistance” to servicememberswho first enter active duty between 1985 and 2030. §3011(a).Montgomery benefits give veterans a “basic educational assistanceallowance” that “help[s] meet, in part, the expenses of suchindividual’s subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books,equipment, and other educational costs.” §3014(a); see also §3015(setting forth amount of assistance). This limited stipendordinarily does not pay the full costs of a veteran’seducation.As with other GI bills, the Montgomery GI Billconsists of a detailed series of statutory provisions that includean entitlement and also durational limits. To be “entitled to basiceducational assistance” under the Montgomery benefits program, aservicemember must satisfy certain military servicerequirements—typically two or three years of continuous activeduty. §3011(a). The servicemember is then “entitled to 36 months”of Montgomery benefits. §§3013(a)(1), (c)(1). An eligibleservicemember “may make an election not to receive[Montgomery benefits],” §3011(c)(1) (emphasis added), but unless heopts out, he contributes $1,200 into the program, usually through aseries of pay reductions. §§3011(b)(1)–(2). The Montgomery Bill’s36-month entitlement is also “[s]ubject to section 3695,”§3013(a)(1), a provision that predates Montgomery and limits “[t]heaggregate period for which any person may receive assistance undertwo or more [GI bills]” to 48 months, §3695(a).The second GI bill at issue in this case is thePost-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 122Stat.2357, 38 U.S.C. §3301 etseq. When itenacted this bill, Congress expressly recognized that “[s]ervice onactive duty in the Armed Forces has been especially arduous... since September 11, 2001,” and that the MontgomeryGI Bill’s modest educational benefits, which were “designed forpeacetime service,” had become “outmoded.” §§5002(2), (4), 122Stat.2358. Therefore, the Post-9/11 GI Bill gives servicemembers“enhanced educational assistance benefits” that “are commensuratewith the educational assistance benefits provided by a gratefulNation to veterans of World War II.” §5002(6), ibid. Aservicemember entitled to Post-9/11 benefits ordinarily receivesthe actual net cost of in-state tuition, additional public-privatecost sharing to cover the cost at private institutions, a monthlyhousing stipend, a lump sum for books and supplies, and additionalamounts for other specified expenses. 38 U.S.C.§§3313(c), 3315–3318.As with the Montgomery GI Bill, the Post-9/11 GIBill establishes an entitlement and also prescribes durationallimits. To be entitled to Post-9/11 benefits, servicemembers musttypically serve on active duty in the Armed Forces for at leastthree years starting on or after September 11, 2001. §3311(b).“[A]n individual entitled to educational assistance under [thePost-9/11 GI Bill] is entitled to ... 36 months” ofenhanced educational benefits. §3312(a). And as with Montgomerybenefits, this entitlement is “[s]ubject to section 3695,”ibid., meaning that a servicemember’s aggregate benefitsfrom the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other GI bills are capped at 48months, see §3695(a).Because the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills coveroverlapping service periods, eligibility for benefits under thesetwo bills overlaps as well. Consequently, the Post-9/11 GI Billcontains a provision titled “[b]ar to duplication of educationalassistance benefits.” §3322. This bar clarifies that an individualwith entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits “maynot receive assistance under two or more such programsconcurrently, but shall elect ... under which chapteror provisions to receive educational assistance.” §3322(a). A laterenacted provision further ensures that an individual may notreceive double credit for a single period of service; rather, he“shall elect ... under which authority such service isto be credited.” §3322(h)(1).Thus, to summarize: Per §3322, servicememberswho are eligible for educational benefits under either theMontgomery GI Bill or the Post-9/11 GI Bill—from a period ofservice that could qualify for either program—can opt to creditthat service toward one educational benefits program or the other.If servicemembers serve for long enough, they may be entitled toboth. But such servicemembers cannot receive disbursem*nts fromboth entitlement programs at the same time, nor may they receiveany combination of benefits for longer than 48 months. Outside ofthose limitations, their service “entitle[s]” them to the benefitsthat they have earned, and the VA “shall pay” them these benefits.§§3011(a), 3014(a), 3311(a), 3313(a).BWhen it enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill,Congress addressed one immediate problem that arose due to the lagtime between the start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill’s entitlementperiod and the bill’s effective date. The case before us concernsthe scope of that solution.As we have explained, the Post-9/11 GI Billcreated an educational benefits entitlement for veterans who serveon or after September 11, 2001. But the legislation granting thatentitlement was not passed until 2008 and did not take effect untilAugust 1, 2009. See 122Stat. 2378. Thus, servicemembers who wereentitled to Post-9/11 benefits but had been funneled through theMontgomery program until the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effectneeded a way to access the more generous Post-9/11 benefitsprogram.Section 3322(d) informs these servicemembersthat “coordination of entitlement to educational assistance under[the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and [the Montgomery GIBill] on the other, shall be governed by [§3327].” Then, under§3327, an individual who meets the criteria for Montgomery benefitsand Post-9/11 benefits based on the same (overlapping) period ofservice can elect to exchange the Montgomery benefits he hasreceived for the Post-9/11 benefits that he wants. Section 3327(a)states that “[a]n individual may elect to receive educationalassistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill]” if they meet twocriteria. First, they must fall into one of six categories “as ofAugust 1, 2009,” including, as relevant here, individuals who are“entitled to [Montgomery benefits].” §§3327(a)(1)(A), (C). Second,they must “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to [Post-9/11benefits]” “as of the date of the” §3327(a) election.§3327(a)(2).Making a §3327(a) election effects a swap byoperation of §3327(d): “[A]n individual making an election under[§3327(a)] shall be entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits], instead of[Montgomery benefits].” §3327(d)(1). And, notably, the statutefurther clarifies that, if the individual has already used someMontgomery benefits when he makes that swap, the new entitlement isnot a full 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits. Instead, his newentitlement capped at “the number of months of unused entitlement... under [the Montgomery GI Bill], as of the date ofthe election.” §3327(d)(2)(A). Once a servicemember elects to swaphis Montgomery benefits entitlement for a Post-9/11 benefitsentitlement, that “election ... is irrevocable.”§3327(i).IIPetitioner James Rudisill spent nearly eightyears on active duty in the U.S. Army, providing threedistinct periods of military service.[3] He was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, experiencedcombat, and sustained multiple injuries. He reached the rank ofcaptain and earned several medals and commendations, including aBronze Star. After each period of service, Rudisill received anhonorable discharge.In between his second and third periods ofmilitary service, Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree. To helpfinance this education, he used 25 months and 14 days of theMontgomery benefits he was entitled to receive due to his firstperiod of service. After graduating in 2007, he reenrolled in theArmy for a third period. By 2015, Rudisill successfully soughtadmission to Yale Divinity School; he intended to earn and use thatdegree to become a chaplain in the Army.To fund his graduate school education, Rudisillapplied to the VA for Post-9/11 benefits, relying on theentitlement that he had earned with respect to his second and thirdperiods of service. But the VA issued a certificate of eligibilitystating that Rudisill was only eligible for 10 months and 16 daysof Post-9/11 benefits—the length of his unused Montgomery benefits.This response did not accord with Rudisill’s understanding of thescope of his entitlement: In his view, he had earned an entitlementto 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits based on his second and thirdperiods of service, and he could use 22 months and 16 days of thatPost-9/11 entitlement due to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefitscap. Rudisill filed a notice of disagreement with the VA, whicheventually denied his claim for the additional entitlement.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’sdecision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed. Itreasoned that although the statutory scheme was ambiguous, thestatutory structure, regulatory framework, congressional purpose,and pro-veteran canon supported Rudisill’s interpretation of thestatute. BO v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321 (2019).Over a dissent, a panel of the Federal Circuitagreed, holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifyingservice are not subject to §3327(d)(2). 4 F.4th 1297 (2021).The en banc Federal Circuit then considered the matter, and,overruling the panel in a 10-to-2 decision, it reversed. 55 F. 4th879 (2022). It explained that, when Rudisill sought to use hisPost-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under §3327(a)(1),making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s limit.We granted certiorari and now reverse thejudgment of the Federal Circuit. 599 U.S. ___ (2023).IIIThe question before us is this: Whenservicemembers have separate entitlements to both Montgomery andPost-9/11 benefits, can they use their benefits, in any order, upto §3695’s aggregate 48-month cap? In the Government’s telling, aveteran in this position is subject to §3322(d)’s mandatorycoordination clause; to receive any Post-9/11 benefits, hemust make an election under §3327(a), which subjects him to§3327(d)(2). By contrast, Rudisill argues that he already has twoseparate entitlements to benefits—36 months under each program—so§3322(d) does not apply to him. And, even if it did, Rudisill says,§3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional, and he does not forfeitany entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) election.As explained below, the pertinent statutory textresolves this dispute in Rudisill’s favor. Section 3327(d)(2)’slimit applies only to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election.But Rudisill never made an election under §3327(a), nor must hehave done so, because §3327 is triggered only if a servicemember is“coordinat[ing]” an entitlement per §3322(d). Someone in Rudisill’ssituation—who just uses one of his two entitlements—is notcoordinating anything. This view is further reinforced by ourreading of §3327(a). That provision’s election mechanism isoptional, and Rudisill does not forfeit his entitlements bydeclining to make a §3327(a) election.AWe start by examining Rudisill’s benefitsentitlements generally. It is undisputed that Rudisill earned twoseparate entitlements to educational benefits due to the length ofhis military service. Based on his first period of service, hebecame “entitled to” Montgomery benefits, as the statute clearlystates. §3011(a). Equally clear is that his second and thirdperiods of service “entitled” him to Post-9/11 benefits.§3311(a).So, from the outset, we know that Rudisillearned two separate benefits entitlements, one per the MontgomeryGI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in themilitary for nearly eight years over three separate periods.Notably, our analysis does not focus on his periods of service.Contra, post, at 7–8 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, whatmatters is that his lengthy service conferred two separateentitlements.Recognizing Rudisill’s separate entitlementsleads us to two observations. First, the statute establishes abaseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA must pay aveteran’s benefits. The Montgomery GI Bill requires that “[t]heSecretary shall pay to each individual entitled to[Montgomery benefits] who is pursuing an approved program ofeducation a basic educational assistance allowance.” §3014(a)(emphasis added). Likewise, the Post-9/11 GI Bill states that“[t]he Secretary shall pay to each individual entitled to[Post-9/11 benefits] who is pursuing an approved program ofeducation ... the amounts specified.” §3313(a)(emphasis added).Second, Congress has clearly and plainlydelineated certain durational limits on these benefitsentitlements. Montgomery and Post-9/11 entitlements have specifiedouter limits: Each program entitles the recipient to up to 36months of benefits, and both are “[s]ubject to section 3695,” whichimposes a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. §§3013(a)(1), 3312(a).The benefits entitlements are likewise qualified by certainenumerated exceptions. Ibid.Thus, even before turning to the statutoryprovisions that are most directly implicated here, it is clear that(1) Rudisill is separately entitled to each of two educationalbenefits; and (2) absent specified limits, the VA is statutorilyobligated to pay him 48 months of benefits. As explained below, nostatutory constraint prevents Rudisill from accessing his benefits,up to 48 months, in whichever order he chooses.BSection 3322(d) is the first of two statutoryprovisions that are at the heart of this dispute. That subsection,titled “Additional coordination matters,” states:“In the case of an individual entitled toeducational assistance under [the Montgomery GI Bill or otherspecified programs], or making contributions toward [the MontgomeryProgram], as of August 1, 2009, coordination of entitlement toeducational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the onehand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other, shall begoverned by [ 38 U.S.C. §3327].”There is no dispute that subsection (d) appliesto a servicemember who is entitled to Montgomery benefits but hasbecome eligible for Post-9/11 benefits for his period of qualifyingservice as of August 1, 2009, given the overlap of those twoentitlement programs. See Part I–B, supra. But in thecontext of the instant dispute, the Government argues, and thedissent echoes, that an individual who has two separate benefitsentitlements under the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills must also“coordinate” those two entitlements under §3322(d) in order toaccess his Post-9/11 benefits. We conclude that the plain text of§3322(d) does not support that assertion.First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty forany veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receivebenefits. Sections 3011 through 3014, which outline the Montgomeryentitlement, do not refer to coordination. Nor do §§3311 through3313, which establish the Post-9/11 benefits entitlement. And§3695—the provision that specifically addresses veterans with morethan one entitlement—does not require, or even mention,coordination.For the person covered by §3322(d)’scoordination requirement, the provision does discuss “coordinationof entitlement” to benefits. But the statute distinguishes between“entitlement to” and “receipt of” benefits. For example,§§3322(e), (f), and (g) bar duplicative receipt ofbenefits. Similarly, §3322(a) says that a servicemember “may notreceive” two benefits at the same time. But §3322(d) does notconcern the receipt of benefits—that term appears nowhere inthat subsection. Instead, subsection (d) addresses “coordination ofentitlement.” Rudisill has no need to coordinate any entitlement:He is already entitled to two separate benefits. Section3322(d) says that “coordination of entitlement ...shall be governed by” §3327, but, as Rudisill correctly observes,with nothing to coordinate, §3327 does not govern.Both the Government and the dissent argue thatthis view misconstrues the meaning of the term “coordination.” Intheir view, “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement is not converting orexchanging entitlements. But what, then, does it mean to coordinatean entitlement under this statutory scheme? They contend thatcoordination “refers to a veteran choosing which ‘entitlement’... he would like to use.” Post, at 5 (opinionof Thomas, J.). But choosing an entitlement is an election, notcoordination. And the statute uses the word “elect” repeatedly tosay that veterans should choose between two different entitlements.Here, §3322(d) speaks of “coordination,” not “election,” and wegenerally “presume differences in language like this conveydifferences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USAInc., 582 U.S. 79, 86 (2017).Nor does the reference to “coordination” insubsection (d) exist in isolation. Rather, subsection (d) points to§3327, which—as we explain below, see Part III–C–2,infra—tells us what coordination means: making an electionthat permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “insteadof” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1). In ordinary parlance,if a person who is directed to “coordinate,” receives one thing“instead of” another, that “coordination” is understood toeffect a swap.If we were left with any doubt that §3322(d)simply does not speak to a veteran who just wants to use one of histwo separate entitlements, two additional clues would tip thebalance. First, §3322 is titled “Bar to duplication” of benefits.There is no duplication for someone in Rudisill’s situation. Heearned each benefit separately, and he is asking to receive eachbenefit separately. “[S]ection headings ... ‘supplycues’ as to what Congress intended,” Merit Management Group,LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 380 (2018),and §3322’s heading tells us that its provisions prevent doubledipping, something that Rudisill is not doing.Second, §3322(d) applies to individuals withMontgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009.” The Government saysthat this language just references the bill’s effective date. SeeBrief for Respondent 16, and n. But, in the entire Post-9/11 GIBill, only two statutory provisions—§3322(d) and§3327(a)(1)—specifically reference this date. Why would Congressrefer to the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill in only thesetwo places and nowhere else?The most logical inference is that this date ismaterial to the work of those particular provisions. And under theinterpretation we adopt today, August 1, 2009, is highly relevant,because before then, individuals could have been accruing Post-9/11benefits (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no wayto opt into that benefits program. The swap Congress devised in§3327 gives such individuals a mechanism for accessing thesebenefits. The invocation of the bill’s effective date in §3322(d)thus provides another clue that these provisions are not relevantto someone, like Rudisill, who has no need to make a swap.[4]Adding all this up, we come to the conclusionthat §3322(d) serves a specific function: to allow individuals withMontgomery benefits who would prefer to swap them for Post-9/11benefits to “coordinate” these entitlements via §3327. But when aperson already has two separate entitlements and simply usesone after the other, he is not coordinating anything. Because thatis Rudisill’s situation, §3322(d) does not speak to him.CBased on the analysis we have already laidout, Rudisill never reaches §3327 when using his benefits becausehe is not coordinating his entitlements. And the contention thatRudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking §3327 iscontradicted by the text of §3327 itself.1We cannot agree that, to receive Post-9/11benefits, a servicemember in Rudisill’s situation must elect themvia §3327. The statute simply does not say that a servicememberwith more than one entitlement receives Post-9/11 benefits only bymaking a §3327(a) election.To start, a §3327(a) election is optional: Aneligible individual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11benefits. “‘[T]he “word ‘may’ clearly connotesdiscretion.”’” Opati v. Republic ofSudan, 590 U.S. 418, 428 (2020). So a veteran can opt for a§3327(a) election, but he does not have to.If he decides not to opt for a §3327(a)election, nothing in §3327, §3322, or anywhere else purports toalter his entitlement. Instead, the veteran remains in the exactsame position as before. A veteran who had only Montgomery benefitsis left with only Montgomery benefits. Likewise, for the veteran(like Rudisill) who started out with both Montgomery and Post-9/11benefits, both sets of benefits remain.To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11benefits only by making a §3327(a) election, the dissentinvokes—and misreads—§3322(a). See post, at 5 (opinion ofThomas, J.). To repeat, as relevant here, §3322(a) provides: “Anindividual entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits] who is also eligiblefor [Montgomery benefits] may not receive assistance under [both]programs concurrently, but shall elect ... under whichchapter or provisions to receive educational assistance.” As isclear from its text, §3322(a) just says, and means, that a veterancannot use Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits at the same time tofund his education. Section 3322(a) bars double dipping—it does notimpose a substantive requirement to elect benefits via§3327(a).So, while Rudisill must make an election per§3322(a) when he wants to have a particular aspect of his educationfunded, it does not follow that he must also make an election under§3327(a). The two elections are completely different, and makingone is not the same as making the other. By blurring all electionsinto one, instead of recognizing that the statute contemplatesmultiple distinct elections, the Government—and the dissent—make acrucial misstep.In this regard, it is noteworthy that §3322(a)does not mention, much less cross-reference, either §3322(d)or §3327. Even though §3322(a) and §3327(a) both use theword “elect,” nothing in the text of either provision suggests thatthese two elections are one and the same. Rather, to “elect” justmeans to choose. See New Oxford American Dictionary 545 (2d ed.2005) (“elect” means to “opt for or choose to do something”). Andthat says nothing about the substance of any option.Other parts of the statute confirm that not allelections are the same. For example, §3322(a) requires a personwith two or more entitlements to “elect” which to receive at anygiven time, while §3322(h) bars “duplication of eligibility basedon a single event or period of service,” and thus requires certainindividuals to “elect” under which benefits programs their serviceis to be credited.[5] Turningto §3327, subsection (a) similarly allows a person who is entitledto Montgomery benefits to “elect” to receive Post-9/11 benefitsunder certain circ*mstances, and subsection (c)(1) lets a person“elect” to revoke an entitlement that he previously transferred.Furthermore and importantly, subsection (i) refers to these twoelections separately. See §3327(i) (“An election under subsection(a) or (c)(1) is irrevocable”). In the context of a statute thatestablishes multiple distinct elections, attempts to equate a§3322(a) election with a §3327(a) election are unpersuasive.2Undeterred, the Government turns to §3327(d),which details the consequences of making an election under§3327(a). But the plain text of §3327(d) makes clear that theprovision does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill’ssituation.From its start, §3327(d) contradicts theGovernment’s reading of the statute. Section 3327(d)(1) tells usthat “an individual making an election under [§3327(a)] shall beentitled to [Post-9/11 benefits] instead of basic[Montgomery benefits].” §3327(d)(1) (emphasis added). In otherwords, he swaps out his entitlement to Montgomery benefits for anentitlement to Post-9/11 benefits. Rudisill had no need to getPost-9/11 benefits “instead of” Montgomery benefits, becausehe was already entitled to both benefits.For veterans who have used some but not all oftheir Montgomery benefits, §3327(d)(2)(A) lays out one furtherconsequence of making a §3327 election: When these veterans “mak[e]an election under [§3327(a)], the number of months of [Post-9/11benefits] shall be ... the number of months of unused[Montgomery benefits], as of the date of the election.” Two aspectsof this provision stand out.First, like subsection (d)(1), this limitationonly applies to “an individual making an election under subsection(a).” So, if a person does not make a §3327(a) election,§3327(d)(2) does not limit his entitlement.Second, this provision makes perfect sense underRudisill’s interpretation of the statute. If a veteran served forthree years, he earned 36 months of benefits. If he receivedMontgomery benefits for this service but should have been able toget Post-9/11 benefits, due to the overlap in the eligibility forthese programs, §3327 lets him opt for Post-9/11 benefits instead.But if he has already used some benefits at the time he elects theswap, a §3327(a) election does not entitle him to a full 36-monthperiod of Post-9/11 benefits in addition to the Montgomery benefitshe has already used. Instead, §3327(d)(2) ensures that his oneperiod of service entitles him to 36 months of educational benefitsin total—no more, and no less.By contrast, §3327(d)(2) is nonsensical underthe Government’s view of the statute. It would impose anexhaust-or-forfeit requirement for veterans with two separateentitlements: Either use up all of your Montgomery benefits (sothat you can get your full 48 months of benefits), or lose anyentitlement in excess of 36 months.[6] At the very least, this would be an odd way to createan exhaustion requirement, and the Government has not pointed us toany comparable one in this statutory scheme or elsewhere. Again,the more sensible view—and the view that the statutory text bestsupports—is that §3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one’sentitlement through the swapping mechanism §3327 creates, and isthus not an exhaustion requirement at all.In sum, §3327(a)’s election mechanism is anoptional means of trading an existing benefits entitlement forPost-9/11 benefits. Although §3327 details the consequences ofmaking that election, those consequences—by their own terms—applyonly to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election. On the otherhand, the entitlements of a person who does not make a §3327(a)election are not altered. In Rudisill’s case, that leaves him withtwo different entitlements (one under the Montgomery GI Bill andthe other under the Post-9/11 GI Bill) that the VA “shall pay” tohim, subject only to §3695’s 48-month cap. §§3014(a), 3313(a).*  *  *The bottom line is this: Veterans whoseparately accrue benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11GI Bills are entitled to both benefits. Neither §3322(d) nor §3327restrict veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek touse either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his benefits, in any order,up to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. If the statute wereambiguous, the pro- veteran canon would favor Rudisill, but thestatute is clear, so we resolve this case based on statutory textalone. Because the Federal Circuit incorrectly limited Rudisill’sbenefits, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–888_________________JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENISR. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRSon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the federal circuit[April 16, 2024]Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins,dissenting.Our country rewards those who serve in the ArmedForces with educational benefits. This case involves theeducational benefits available under the Montgomery GI Bill and themore recent Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Post-9/11 benefits are moregenerous than the Montgomery benefits, and veterans are sometimesentitled to benefits under both programs. By statute, however,veterans cannot receive benefits under both programs at the sametime. Congress therefore created an election mechanism that allowsveterans to switch from Montgomery benefits to Post-9/11 benefits.Under that mechanism, when a veteran switches to Post-9/11 benefitsafter using some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits, theamount of his Post-9/11 benefits is limited to the number of monthshe had remaining for Montgomery benefits. 38 U.S.C.§3327(d). The question here is whether this limitation applies toJames Rudisill, a retired captain in the U.S. Army.The Court agrees that Rudisill could not use histwo sets of benefits concurrently, and that he switched toPost-9/11 benefits when he had some remaining Montgomery benefits.Ante, at 7, 14. But, it declines to apply the statute’scorresponding limitation on his benefits because Rudisill wasseparately entitled to Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits due to hismultiple periods of service. Ante, at 2. Because thisapproach conflicts with the statute’s plain text, I respectfullydissent.ISince World War II, Congress has enactednumerous statutes that provide veterans with a range of educationalbenefits, commonly called GI bills. Two of these statutes are atissue here: the Veterans’ Educational Assistance Program Act of1984 (Montgomery GI Bill), 38 U.S.C. §3001 etseq., and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act(Post-9/11 GI Bill), 38 U.S.C. §3301 et seq. Asthe majority explains, the Montgomery GI Bill had been the primarysource of educational benefits since 1985, but, in direct responseto the September 11, 2001, attacks and the ensuing conflict,Congress enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill and made its benefitsretroactively available. Ante, at 3–4. The Montgomery andPost-9/11 programs differ in meaningful ways. Montgomery benefitsprovide a modest, fixed monthly stipend, whereas Post-9/11 benefitsare more generous and can cover the actual net cost of in-statetuition, along with other expenses such as tutorial assistance andlicensing test fees. Compare, e.g., §3015 with§§3313–3315, 3317–3318.Both programs impose a durational cap on thebenefits that an individual may receive. Regardless of how long aveteran has served or how many periods of service he has, aqualifying veteran is generally eligible for a maximum of 36 monthsof benefits under each program. §§3013, 3312. In addition, there isan aggregate cap on benefits that applies across programs. Noveteran may receive more than 48 months of educational benefitstotal. §3695.The two educational-benefit programs coveroverlapping time periods. And, several statutory provisions addressthis overlap. No veteran can use the two sets of benefitsconcurrently. §3322(a). Veterans accordingly must “elect” whichbenefits to receive at a specific time. Ibid. As relevanthere, there is a condition attached to one particular election.Under §3327, if a veteran elects to switch to Post-9/11 benefitswhen he “has used, but retains unused,” Montgomery benefits, he issubject to a statutory “[l]imitation on entitlement.” Under thislimitation, the amount of his Post-9/11 benefits will be limited to“the number of months of unused entitlement of the individualunder” the Montgomery program. §3327(d)(2)(A).[1]The question before us is whether that statutorylimitation applies to Rudisill’s benefits. Rudisill served duringthree separate periods, spanning roughly eight years. He firstenlisted in the Army in 2000 and served until 2002. During thisperiod of service, Rudisill became eligible for Montgomerybenefits. He used some of these benefits to start and, after asecond period of service spanning about a year and a half, completean undergraduate degree. Rudisill then rejoined the Army as acommissioned officer, serving from 2007 to 2011. Rudisill’s secondand third periods of service made him eligible for Post-9/11benefits. After he completed his third period of military service,he was admitted to Yale Divinity School.Rudisill sought to use his remaining benefits tofund his graduate education at Yale. At that time, Rudisill hadused 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefits for hisundergraduate education. This left him with 10 months and 16 daysof remaining Montgomery benefits. Rather than use these remainingbenefits, however, Rudisill decided to switch to his Post-9/11benefits. As part of that switch, Rudisill filled out a Departmentof Veterans Affairs (VA) form electing to receive Post-9/11benefits “in lieu of” Montgomery benefits. App. 1a. Heexpressly acknowledged that his “months of entitlement underchapter 33”—i.e., Post-9/11 benefits—would be “limited tothe number of months of entitlement remaining under chapter30”—i.e., Montgomery benefits. Ibid.Applying the limitation on entitlement in §3327,the VA awarded Rudisill Post-9/11 benefits for 10 months and 16days—the amount he had remaining for his Montgomery benefits.Rudisill appealed, arguing that the §3327 limitation did not applyto him because he had separate entitlements to Montgomery andPost-9/11 benefits due to his multiple periods of service. Sittingen banc, the Federal Circuit held that the VA had correctly appliedthe statutory limitation to Rudisill’s benefits. I wouldaffirm.IIRudisill’s Post-9/11 benefits are limited tothe amount of Montgomery benefits he had not used. Because he couldnot use his sets of benefits concurrently, the statute requiredthat Rudisill coordinate his entitlements, and that suchcoordination would be governed by §3327. Rudisill then used theelection mechanism in §3327 to switch to Post-9/11 benefits afterhe had used some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits. Bymaking that election, the statute limited his benefits to theamount of Montgomery benefits he had left. Because the statutoryscheme directs how a veteran in Rudisill’s position can switch toPost-9/11 benefits, I would apply that mechanism to Rudisill’selection—and the cost that comes with it.As an initial matter, there is no dispute thatRudisill cannot use his Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefitsconcurrently. See Brief for Petitioner 39–40; ante, at 14.Under §3322(a), a veteran “entitled to” Post-9/11 benefits “who isalso eligible” for Montgomery benefits “may not receive assistanceunder two or more such programs concurrently, but shall elect (insuch form and manner as the Secretary may prescribe) under whichchapter or provisions to receive educational assistance.” BecauseRudisill is entitled to Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits, hecannot receive both benefits at the same time. Instead, he “shallelect” which benefits to receive.How does Rudisill “elect” which benefits toreceive? That is the core of the dispute in this case. In my view,the statute answers that question by requiring Rudisill tocoordinate his entitlements and creating an election mechanism forhim to do so. After barring the concurrent use of benefits in§3322(a), Congress included a provision titled “[a]dditionalcoordination matters” in subsection (d). This coordinationprovision states that “[i]n the case of” a veteran “entitled”to benefits under certain other chapters—including the Montgomerychapter—“coordination of entitlement to educational assistanceunder this [Post-9/11] chapter, on the one hand, and such chaptersor provisions, on the other, shall be governed by [ 38U.S.C. §3327].”The “coordination” here refers to a veteranchoosing which “entitlement”—i.e., set of benefits—hewould like to use. The ordinary meaning of “coordination” is “[t]heaction of arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree.”3 Oxford English Dictionary 898 (2d ed. 1989); see also RandomHouse Dictionary of the English Language 447 (2d ed. 1987)(defining “coordinate” as “to place or arrange in proper order orposition” and “to assume proper order or relation”); Webster’sThird New International Dictionary 501–502 (1981) (defining“coordination” as “arrangement in the same order, class, rank, ordignity” and “coordinate” as “to make coordinate; put in the sameorder or rank”). In this context, coordination refers to a veteranordering his sets of benefits. A veteran’s entitlement to bothMontgomery and Post-9/11 benefits necessarily requires“coordination” because he cannot use them concurrently, assubsection (a) prohibits such use. And, subsection (d) explainsthat such coordination “shall be governed” by §3327.[2]Unsurprisingly, the coordination provisionpoints to an election mechanism. As relevant, under §3327(a)(1), aveteran “may elect to receive educational assistance under this[Post-9/11] chapter” if he meets certain criteria. “[A]s of August1, 2009,” the veteran must be “entitled” to Montgomery benefits and“mee[t] the requirements for entitlement” to Post-9/11 benefits.§§3327(a)(1), (2). Next, a veteran may make this election to switchto Post-9/11 benefits if he “has used, but retains unused,entitlement under [the Montgomery] chapter.” §3327(a)(1). Put moresimply, this election mechanism applies to a veteran who isentitled to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits and has usedsome, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits.There is a consequence, however, for using thiselection mechanism. By making a §3327(a)(1) election, a veterantriggers a “[l]imitation on entitlement.” §3327(d)(2). Under thatlimitation, the veteran’s Post-9/11 benefits are limited to “thenumber of months of unused entitlement of the individual under [theMontgomery] chapter ... as of the date of theelection.” §3327(d)(2)(A). That is, a veteran with remainingMontgomery benefits who elects to switch to his Post-9/11 benefitsis limited to the amount of Montgomery benefits he hasremaining.Rudisill is covered by the election mechanismand its accompanying limitation. He is entitled to both Montgomeryand Post-9/11 benefits. And, as of August 1, 2009, he had used, butretained unused, Montgomery benefits. Section 3327(a) thereforeprovided him a mechanism by which he could elect to switch toPost-9/11 benefits. And, Rudisill made that election. App. 1a (“Byelecting Chapter 33, I acknowledge that I understand... my months of entitlement under chapter 33 will belimited to the number of months of entitlement remaining underchapter 30”). Because Rudisill elected to switch to his Post-9/11benefits before exhausting his Montgomery benefits, he was subjectto the corresponding limitation on his entitlement: He couldreceive Post-9/11 benefits for only the months remaining on hisMontgomery benefits. Indeed, the VA informed him of thisconsequence before he made his election, and Rudisill acknowledgedit. See ibid. Applying this limitation, the en banc FederalCircuit correctly found that Rudisill was limited to 10 months and16 days of Post-9/11 benefits for his graduate education. Thatstraightforward conclusion follows from the statutory scheme thatCongress created. I would simply apply that statutory limit toRudisill.IIIRudisill and the majority make variousattempts at avoiding the statute’s inevitable conclusion, but nonehits the mark. That is in large part because the statute’s text,though complicated, is ultimately unambiguous. Accordingly, they donot dispute that Rudisill earned entitlements to both Montgomeryand Post-9/11 benefits and that he cannot use these entitlementsconcurrently. Ante, at 9, 14; Brief for Petitioner 25–26,39–40. They do not dispute that he made an election to switch toPost-9/11 benefits. Ante, at 14; Brief for Petitioner 26–27;App. 1a. And, they do not dispute that, when he made that election,he had used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefits. Ante,at 7; Brief for Petitioner 26.Instead, Rudisill’s primary argument is that thespecific provisions in the statute governing coordination andelection do not apply to veterans who have multiple periods ofservice. But, Rudisill acknowledges that the text of §3327(a) “doesnot state that its election mechanism is limited to veterans withonly a single period of service.” Id., at 46. There islikewise no language in the coordination provision of §3322(d) thatplainly cabins its application based upon periods of service.Because the plain text contains no carveout based on periods ofservice, that should be the end of the debate.Rudisill’s contrary argument is especiallyunconvincing given that Congress included other period-of-servicelimitations in the very subchapter at issue. See Rotkiske v.Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Atextual judicialsupplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here,Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted languageor provision”). Congress provided that a “period of servicecounted for purposes ... of an education loan under [adifferent program] may not be counted as a period of servicefor entitlement to educational assistance under this [Post-9/11]chapter.” §3322(b) (emphasis added); see also §3322(h) (creating a“[b]ar to duplication of eligibility based on a single event orperiod of service” (emphasis added)). Congress could havechosen to similarly limit the scope of §3322’s coordinationprovision or §3327’s election mechanism based upon periods ofservice or separate entitlements, but it did not. We cannot do soof our own accord.Next, Rudisill contends that the electionmechanism in §3327 is merely meant to provide veterans with asingle period of service a way to convert lesser Montgomerybenefits into more generous Post-9/11 benefits on a one-to-onebasis.The text of §3327 makes clear, however, that itis a mechanism for making an election to switch from Montgomerybenefits to Post-9/11 benefits—not merely a way to convert one intothe other. Section 3327 provides how a veteran “may elect toreceive” Post-9/11 benefits instead of his Montgomery benefits.And, it echoes §3322(a)’s requirement that a veteran entitled tomultiple sets of benefits “shall elect” which benefits to receivebecause he cannot use them concurrently. Moreover, the electionmechanism applies only to veterans who are already eligiblefor both programs. See §3327(a) (requiring a veteran to be“entitled to basic educational assistance under [the Montgomery]chapter” and “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement toeducational assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter”). Because aveteran must already qualify for Post-9/11 benefits, this mechanismcannot provide a way for veterans who lack Post-9/11 benefits to“convert” their Montgomery benefits. Indeed, the entire point ofthe election mechanism is to “coordinat[e]” Montgomery andPost-9/11 “entitlement[s]”—i.e., to manage twoexisting entitlements. §3322(d) (cross-referencing §3327). Moreimportantly, §3327(a) does not cabin its application based uponperiod of service or separate entitlements. See supra, at7–8. Rudisill’s interpretation ultimately does not overcome theapplication of §3327’s plain text to his circ*mstance—he isentitled to both sets of benefits and switched to Post-9/11benefits when he “ha[d] used, but retain[ed] unused,” Montgomerybenefits.The majority, for its part, takes a differenttack. Its reasoning seems to rest on the theory that becauseRudisill was “entitled” to Montgomery benefits and “entitled” toPost-9/11 benefits, those multiple entitlements cannot be limitedwhen switching between benefits. Ante, at 9–10. But, themajority’s own reasoning undermines that theory. It agrees thatRudisill cannot receive the full 72 months of benefits he earnedbecause a separate statutory provision limits him to 48 monthstotal. See ante, at 10; §3695. And, it agrees that Rudisillcannot use his two separate entitlements concurrently. Ante,at 5; §3322(a). This is true even though Rudisill is “entitled” to36 months of Montgomery benefits and “entitled” to 36 months ofPost-9/11 benefits. See §§3011(a), 3311(a). In other words, themajority itself admits that Rudisill’s entitlements are notabsolute. But, while the majority accepts certain statutorylimitations on Rudisill’s multiple “entitlements,” it rejectsothers—even ones listed in the same subsection. Indeed, even thoughthe Court agrees that some election must be made, it rejectsthe election process spelled out in the statute to addressRudisill’s circ*mstance. My focus on this election does not“blu[r] all elections into one,” ante, at 15, butrather, applies specific statutory text that plainly coversRudisill.The majority tries to justify its selectivereading of the statute by suggesting that the coordinationprovision in §3322(d) “simply does not speak to a veteran who justwants to use one of his two separate entitlements.” Ante, at12. But that provision specifically governs the “coordination ofentitlement” to Post-9/11 benefits “on the one hand” andMontgomery benefits “on the other.” §3322(d) (emphasis added). Itis unclear how a statute could more explicitly cover theinteraction between two separate entitlements. The majority alsoprovides no satisfactory answer for why the concurrent-use bar in§3322(a) applies to Rudisill, but the coordination provision in§3322(d) does not. Both provisions cover veterans who qualify forboth sets of benefits, yet the majority applies one but not theother to Rudisill. More fundamentally, the Court agrees thatsome election must be made. See ante, at 14. Ratherthan leave Rudisill to make some uncodified election to switch toPost-9/11 benefits, I would apply the election mechanism thatCongress created to cover his circ*mstance.The majority’s remaining arguments are simplycritiques of Congress’s policy judgments. The Court calls theGovernment’s reading of the statute’s election mechanism“nonsensical” because it requires a veteran to exhaust or forfeithis Montgomery benefits before switching to Post-9/11 benefits.Ante, at 17. But, in reality, the election mechanism offersa veteran in Rudisill’s circ*mstance two paths. He may use 48months of benefits by first using all 36 months of his Montgomerybenefits, followed by 12 months of Post-9/11 benefits.[3] Or, he could use 36 months ofbenefits, with his choice of when to switch from Montgomery toPost-9/11 benefits. It is not “remarkable” for Congress to “includea rule allowing individuals to make a wholly voluntary election toreceive a more generous benefit earlier, at a cost.” BO v.Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321, 352 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl. 2019)(Bartley, J., dissenting).In any event, the wisdom of this limitation isnot up to this Court. It was for Congress to decide what Post-9/11benefits a veteran should receive retroactively. As Rudisillacknowledges, the Post-9/11 program is “far more generous” and,accordingly, costs much more than the Montgomery program. Brief forPetitioner 15. Perhaps the limitation on entitlement reflects ameasure to manage this growing cost, given that “[p]assing a lawoften requires compromise.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc.,580 U.S. 288, 306 (2017). Or, perhaps not. Either way, thelimitation is what Congress enacted—whether the majority agreeswith its fairness or not—and the text that Congress enacted mustdictate the result in this case.Moving even further away from the text, themajority hints that the veteran’s canon could apply if the statutewere ambiguous. Ante, at 18. The veteran’s canon directsthat “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S.115, 118 (1994). Yet, as the majority recognizes, this canoncannot apply when the statutory text is plain, so it has no role toplay here. More importantly, substantive canons such as theveteran’s canon rest on uncertain foundations. See Arizonav. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555, 572 (2023) (Thomas, J.,concurring). I share Justice Kavanaugh’s concern that the veteran’scanon “appears to have developed almost by accident,” and noexplanation has been provided for its foundation. Ante, at 2(concurring opinion). I question whether this purported canonshould ever have a role in our interpretation.IVThe Court holds that, although Rudisill mustmake some election to switch from his Montgomery to Post-9/11benefits, the statute’s corresponding limits do not apply becauseit would reduce the amount of available benefits. In my view, theCourt ignores the statutory mechanism that Congress created infavor of an interpretation that reaches a desired outcome. Irespectfully dissent.